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Abstract
Previous research indicates that unenforceable informal contracts (or commit-
ments) promote trust and reciprocity. Nonetheless, while such contracts may
benefit existing exchange, in dynamic environments they may also hinder ones
willingness to explore newly emerging Pareto efficient opportunities. This issue
arises in both business and social contexts, and includes industry non-compete
agreements as well as personal relationship commitment decisions. We report
data from an experiment using a novel three-person trust game where, in differ-
ent treatments, different players are able to communicate with each other. We
find that when, between the point of commitment and the point of decision, no
new information is received regarding the expected value of commitment, then
people overwhelmingly decide in accord with their informal contracts and avoid
exploring potentially Pareto improving opportunities. However, when new in-
formation arises that reduces the relative value of commitment, and when this
occurs following the commitment but before the decision, then people are signif-
icantly more likely to deviate from their informal contract and pursue a Pareto
improvement. Further, we observe a contingency effect where the likelihood with
which people follow an informal commitment declines with the number of contin-
gencies that must occur in order for the contract to be realized. Finally, none of
the theories of lying aversion that we explore are able fully to explain our data.
Keywords: informal contract, communication, behavioral game theory, multi-
trust game.
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1 Introduction
Many forms of partnerships and cooperation rely on informal contracts (e.g.,
non-binding promises, commitments, or statements of intent), particularly in cases
where a formal contract is unavailable or incomplete. Despite the lack of enforce-
ment mechanisms for non-binding contracts/commitment, a growing body of litera-
ture in economics and other fields (e.g., psychology and sociology) suggests that in-
formal contracts/commitments tend to discipline behaviors. That is, people honor
their contracts/commitments even when faced with losing personal monetary pay-
offs. The literature further suggests that communication, particularly informal con-
tract/commitment, is crucial for facilitating cooperation and improving efficiency. (see,
for example Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Charness et al., 2012, 2013; Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2011; Miettinen and Suetens, 2008; Vanberg, 2008; Ellingsen and Johan-
nesson, 2004; Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Loomis, 1959; Sally, 1995). By the
same token, the literature indicates that people not only strive to keep their promises,
but are also averse to breaking informal contracts and lying to others. These en-
couraging findings are based on the results of two-player static decision-making envi-
ronments, which are the focus of the previous literature. However, questions remain
as to: (i) whether these efficiency-enhancing and trust-promoting effects of informal
contract/commitment persist in more dynamic and multi-player environments such
as the world we live in, where new opportunities arise; (ii) whether there are other
environments where informal contract/commitments are less effective in disciplining
behaviors.
Indeed, in more dynamic contexts, commitments (formal or informal) can and some-
times do constrain people from exploring Pareto improving opportunities, in both busi-
ness and social contexts. One example is the case of former Microsoft Vice President
Kai-Fu Lee, who was hired as the chairman of Googles Chinese branch. Mr. Lees
employment with Google was delayed when Microsoft filed a lawsuit claiming that
[a]ccepting such a position with a direct Microsoft competitor like Google violates
the narrow non-competition promise Lee made when he was hired as an executive.
Although Dr. Lee had shown no intention of divulging Microsofts confidential infor-
mation to Google, Microsoft alleged that Dr. Lees employment with Google threatened
the disclosure of Microsofts trade secrets. Both parties eventually settled the case, but
ultimately a huge amount of money and time were lost due to the non-competition
promise Lee made in his employment contract. Such circumstances are far from rare
in the business world. For instance, a startup called CrossGain was forced to lay off
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some 20 Microsoft defectors until their non-compete agreements expired, even though
CrossGain was not in direct competition with Microsoft. And in the social context,
a contract like marriage may similarly act as a constraint towards a better match
discovered later in life.
In this paper, we investigate environments inspired by the examples above. Here,
we introduce dynamics to the two-person static decision-making situation by adding
a third strategic player from whom new beneficial opportunities may arise. Addition-
ally, we allow players to make unbinding informal contracts while varying the path of
communication1.
Our paper makes three key contributions to the literature. First, we provide, to our
knowledge, the first empirical evidence on the propensity of people to keep informal
contracts in environment where doing so is inefficient. Second, we shed light on the
extent to which communication especially in the form of informal contracts can
modulate peoples behaviors. We devise four message treatments to systematically
explore different paths of communication, by varying the pairing of sender and receiver
and the alignment of their monetary interests. Finally, we shed light on the empirical
relevance of existing behavioral theories. In particular, we take our data to the three
current competing theories: innate preference for honesty models (see, e.g., Ellingsen
and Johannesson, 2004; Miettinen and Suetens, 2008; Vanberg, 2008; Gibson et al.,
2013), the consequence based preference model (see, e.g., Battigalli and Dufwenberg,
2007; Battigalli et al., 2013; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) and simple type models
(see, e.g., Hurkens and Kartik, 2009). We derive and summarize testable predictions
from these theories and then compare those predictions with our experimental data.
Our main findings are that: (i) when, between the point of commitment and the
point of decision, no new information is received regarding the expected value of com-
mitment, then people overwhelmingly decide in accord with their informal contracts
and avoid exploring potentially Pareto improving opportunities. However, (ii) when
new information arises that reduces the relative value of commitment, and when this
occurs following the commitment but before the decision, then people are significantly
more likely to deviate from their informal contract and pursue a Pareto improvement.
(iii)We observe a contingency effect where the likelihood with which people follow an
informal commitment declines with the number of contingencies that must occur in
order for the contract to be realized. Finally, none of the theories of lying aversion that
we explore are able fully to explain our data.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the struc-
1Different path of communication here indicates the different pairings of sender and receiver.
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ture of the game and corresponding predictions under various models. Section 3 de-
scribes the key hypotheses. Section 4 details the experiment procedure. Section 5
describes our main results. Section 6 explores possible explanations for the observed-
but-unaccounted-for behaviors, and the final section summarizes and concludes.
2 The Game and Theory Predictions
This section sets the stage for the subsequent experiment. We first introduce the
multi-trust game2 on which our design is based; clarify various communication treat-
ments; and derive the key predictions from existing theories.
2.1 The Multi-trust Game
We devise a novel three-person game, the extensive form of which is shown in
Figure 1. Using backward induction and assuming risk-neutral selfish players, there
is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (In, Out, Right). This equilibrium is
inefficient. Therefore, our game G1 shares the dilemma common to previously studied
trust game variants3.
There are several points to note about our game. First, its structure is closely
related to that described by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). The key difference is
that we add a strategic player in place of chance, yet maintain unobservable actions.
However, unlike Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), where defection necessarily reduces
the trustees payoff, in G1 defection may have no payoff consequences to the trustor.
Second, payoffs in our G1 differ from sequential trust games with constant multipliers
2Our environment can be thought of as including two competing (directly or indirectly) firms,
Acme (A) and Com (C), and worker Brittany (B). Suppose A considers whether to hire B. A would
like to do so, but is concerned about C later hiring B away. The reason is that if C provides B a
better opportunity, after B has worked at A, then B can bring information (e.g., big client lists or
core technologies) that benefits C but harm A. Moreover, passing information may also result in harm
for B (for example, lawsuits or business espionage for worker B, and loss of business for firm A).
Now, in order to convince B to leave A, firm C may make an informal commitment not to reveal any
information that may be (inadvertently) disclosed by worker B. If B accepts this promise, C could
defect, and in doing so, leave both B and C worse off. On the other hand, if C does cooperate, then
firm A is not impacted by B’s departure, but both B and C are made better off. This provides a
possibility to find alternative mechanisms to achieve higher profitability and potentially even better
social outcomes.
3Such related games are Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) – two-person trust game with a hidden
action; Sheremeta and Zhang (2013) & Rietz et al. (2012) – sequential three person trust game; and
Cassar and Rigdon (2011) – three person trust game with one trustee two trustor or one trustor two
trustee, finally Bigoni et al. (2012) – two person trust game with an add-on dominant solvable game
between the trustee and a third player.
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across trustees (e.g., Sheremeta and Zhang (2013) or Rietz et al. (2012)) in that mul-
tipliers in G1 double with the second trustee. This makes it much more profitable to
establish the second partnership. The game below illustrates these ideas.
Figure 1: The Multi-trust Game - G1
A and B consider whether to form a partnership; if no partnership occurs, then
both parties receive the outside option payoff of $5. In this case, C receives $10. If a
partnership is formed, a trust relationship emerges, and the payoffs to this relationship
depend on the B’s decision. B is faced with a dilemma – to stay with the current
partnership (corresponding to B’s Out option) or form an additional trust relationship
with a third person and enjoy a potentially higher payoff (corresponds to B’s In option).
Note that A is NO better off (perhaps even worse off) by B’s choosing In; thus, A would
always prefer B to choose Out and maintain an exclusive partnership. If B chooses to
stay with A (corresponding to the strategy profile (In, Out, Left/Right), both A and B
are better off (with the payoff of $10 for each), and C (who has no move) again earns
the outside option of $10. The strategy profile (In, Out, Left/Right) corresponds to
the situation where an exclusive partnership contract is enforceable. However, such
a contract may not be enforceable. Indeed, B’s choice may not be observable to A,
depending on the Cs decision. Our game captures this as discussed below.
For this case, if B chooses to form a new partnership with C (corresponding to B’s
In option), C can either be cooperative and reciprocal by choosing Left, or defect by
choosing Right. Note that if C chooses Left, B’s behavior is unknown to A (B’s original
partner). However, if C chooses Right, not only does B receive nothing from the newly
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initiated partnership (C takes all), A is also impacted and receives nothing. In this
case, A knows B’s choice. Note that A may foresee such outcomes and choose not to
enter the trust partnership with B. The players choices Out, In and Right describe
those possibilities.
2.2 Communication
We next focus on treatments that differ by whether a pre-play communication
opportunity is available and how such opportunity is presented. Among all the com-
munication treatments, one player transmits a message to the other player(s) before
they play game G1. If we maintain the assumption that players are selfish, then all
the pre-game cheap talk communication should have no effect, and the strategy profile
(In, Out, Right) remains the unique sub-game perfect solution. However, if there are
other concerns that incentivize players, as detailed in the next section, communication
will have an impact on behaviors.
To better investigate the effect of communication, inform and verify various existing
theories, we consider the following communication treatments denoted as B-A, C-B,
C-A, and Double treatments respectively.
In the B-A treatment, prior to the game play, player B can transmit a message to
A. In a similar fashion, in the C-B treatments, player C can transmit a message to B
prior to the game. Similarly, in the C-A treatments, player C can transmit a message
to A.
In the Double treatment, it is common information from the start that role B can
send a message to A, and the experimenters collect those messages and pass them on to
their matched partners. At this point, for player B, the Double treatment is exactly the
same as the B-A treatment. However, after all messages are received, we announce a
surprise communication opportunity where role C has the chance to transmit a message
to B, and after messages from Cs are transmitted, players play the game. Note that
the Double treatment is designed such that we can compare B’s behavior in the B-A
and Double treatments, and Cs behavior in the C-B and Double treatments holding
the players communication opportunity constant.
The next section introduces existing behavioral theories that aim to model the effect
of communication on trust and reciprocity.
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2.3 The Models and Predictions
Standard economic models of self-interest utility maximization emphasize the role
of outcome in dictating agents choices. As a result, these models offer no predictions
on how cheap-talk communications will influence behaviors, since cheap-talk is not an
enforceable commitment and is therefore impossible to verify. One of the important
assumptions in these standard models is that self-interested agents will have no prob-
lem lying or defaulting on their words as long as the resulting outcome is preferred.
However, honesty and promise-keeping behaviors are frequently reported not only on
the news (e.g., the whistleblowers) but also as observations in lab and field experi-
ments. To account for these seemingly puzzling behaviors, researchers have come up
with three types of models: intrinsic preference for honesty models, consequence-based
models, and type models. The following section discusses those models in detail.
2.3.1 Intrinsic Preference For Honesty Models
Among the models of preference for honesty4, there are two main varieties. One
is the homogeneous aversion to lying model suggested by Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2004), Miettinen and Suetens (2008), and Vanberg (2008), where the model assumes
that people incur a similar fixed cost in their utilities when caught lying; the other
is the heterogeneous cost of lying model, where different people might incur different
costs while caught lying (e.g., Gibson et al. (2013)).
Homogeneous aversion to lying model
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) proposed a modified model (based on Fehr and
Schmidt (1999)) (we now call EJ model) with an added universal cost component l to
reflect the universal cost of lying. If there can be no communication, there is no cost
of lying. Thus, in the no-communication baseline game, the predictions correspond to
the case with selfish preferences described in section 2.1.
We define player i as those who communicate and state a verifiable con-
tract/commitment5. Formally, player i has the following simplified utility function:
ui =
{
mi − l if player i lies
mi otherwise.
(1)
4In some papers, it also called lying aversion, or the cost of lying model (for example, Lundquist
et al. (2009)).
5For those who choose not to communicate or send non-verifiable communication, their decision
problems are modeled with standard self-interest maximization. And (In, Out, Right) remains the
unique backward-induction solution.
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where mi denotes agent is immediate monetary payoff , −l denotes the utility loss from
lying. Notice that l is invariant to players therefore implies the assumption that people
share a homogeneous cost to lying6.
G2, G3, G4 in figure 2, 3, 4 model this for B-A, C-B, and Double treatment for
players who communicate and indicate a verifiable contract/commitment. For all
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Figure 2: G2 - B-A treatment
models under consideration, the C-B and C-A treatments are treated exactly the same
(although player B has more direct decision relevance to player C than player A).
Consequently, in the following sections, we do not explain in depth the predictions for
the C-A treatment, they are exactly the same as for the C-B treatment. Notice that
game G2 - G4 is a nonstandard game in which the utilities are not just numbers (mi) at
the end nodes but rather reflect the adjusted utility (ui)(this applies to all the games
in the following sections).
We denote ptϕs the percentage of players p in treatment t choosing strategy s, while
p ∈ {B,C}, t ∈ {Base,BA,CB,CA,Double}, s ∈ {Out,R}, where Base, BA, CB,
CA, Double represent baseline, B-A, C-B, C-A and Double treatment respecitively, and
In and R represent strategy In and Right respectively. For example, BBaseϕIn denotes
the percentage of player B choosing In in Baseline treatment.
6Similarly, Miettinen (2008) introduces similar invariant fixed cost to lying to model the effects of
pre-play agreements in contracts. Vanberg (2008) provides supporting laboratory evidence suggesting
that lack of lying behaviors in his experiment can be better explained with a simple cost of lying
model.
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Figure 3: G3 - C-B(C-A) treatment
Comparing all communication treatments with Baseline, we have the following:
Proposition 1 (EJ model)7 If l < 15, pBaseϕs =
p
jϕs, where j ∈ t and j 6= Baseline; if
l ≥ 15, for player B, BBaseϕOut = BBAϕOut, BBaseϕOut > BCBϕOut = BCAϕOut, BBaseϕOut >
B
DoubleϕOut; for player C,
C
BaseϕR =
C
BAϕR,
C
BaseϕR >
C
CBϕR =
C
CAϕR,
C
BaseϕR <
C
DoubleϕR.
Proof. 1) In the B-A treatment, Right is still the dominant strategy for C, In and
Out remain the best responses for B and A respectively in G2 as in G1. Therefore, we
expect no treatment difference between B-A and Baseline.
2) In the C-B (C-A) treatment, if l ≥ 15, Left becomes the dominant strategy for C,
(In, In) is the best response strategy profile for both A and B. As a result, we expect to
observe a higher percentage of Bs choosing In and a higher percentage of Cs choosing
Left than the Baseline. If l < 15, however, Right once again becomes the dominant
strategy for C. For A and B, the best responses are In and Out. In this case, we expect
no treatment differences between the C-B and Baseline treatments.
3) For the Double treatment, if l ≥ 15, In, Out, Left describe the best responses for
players A, B, C respectively; if l < 15, In, Out, Right are the best responses instead.
Therefore, if l < 15, we should not expect to see treatment differences from Baseline,
7According to Ellingsen and Johanneson (2004), the estimated l is around 21.43 SEK ≈ USD
2.64. If we apply this estimates to our game, l = 2.64 < 15, we should expect no effects at all across
treatments.
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Figure 4: G4 - Double treatment
and communication in the form of cheap talk has no effect on the behavior of all players.
If l ≥ 15, we should observe an increased rate of player B choosing In for Double
compared with the Baseline Treatment; for player C, we should observe an decreased
frequency of choosing Right in the Double treatment compared with Baseline.
In order to make within-treatment comparisons, we have to make one simple as-
sumption:
Assumption 1 The frequency of informal contract/commitment exchanged is constant
from the same role.
Assumption 1 implies that: 1) the percentage of Bs sending informal contracts in the
B-A treatment is comparable to that in the Double treatment; 2) the percentage of
Cs exchanging informal commitment in the C-B treatment is comparable to that in
the Double treatment; and 3) the percentage of Bs receiving informal contracts in the
C-B treatment is comparable to that in the Double treatment. We denote that b and
c percent of Bs and Cs send informal contracts respectively, where b, c ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 2 (EJ model) If l < 15, for player B, BBAϕOut =
B
DoubleϕOut =
B
CBϕCB; for player C,
C
BAϕR
C
CBϕR =
C
DoubleϕR. If l ≥ 15, for player B,
B
CBϕOut <
B
DoubleϕOut <
B
BAϕOut; for player C,
C
BAϕR >
C
CBϕR =
C
DoubleϕR.
Proof. 1) In both the B-A and Double treatments, if B is rational and sends a contract,
he will only choose In if p(20 − l) − (1 − p)l > 10, i.e., 20p − l > 10, where p is Cs
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probability of choosing Left. Specifically, in the B-A treatment, p = 0, regardless of
the value of l, it is B’s best response to choose Out (whether or not they send informal
contracts).
2) In the Double treatment, if l < 15, Cs always choose Right whether they send
informal commitment or not, i.e., p = 0. In response to that, all Bs choose Out whether
they receive informal contracts or not. If l ≥ 15, the situation is more complicated.
1 − c percent of Bs do not receive informal contracts, i.e., p = 0, the best response
them is Out. For the remaining Bs who receive informal contracts, b · c percent of Bs
also send informal contracts, in this case, p = 1, and 20− l ≤ 5 < 10, the best response
is Out ; (1− b) · c percent of Bs do not send informal contracts but receive one from C,
p = 1 and 10 < 20p, their best response is instead In. In sum, BDoubleϕOut = 1−(1−b)·c.
3) In C-B treatment, if B is rational and send informal contracts, he will only choose
In if 20p > 10, i.e., p > 0.5. If l < 15, Out is B’s best response since p = 0. If l ≥ 15,
c percent of Bs receive informal contracts from C (p = 1), In is the best response.
For the remaining 1 − c percent of Bs who do not receive informal contracts from C,
Out is the best response. And BCBϕOut = 1 − c. Since c > c(1 − b) > 0, we have
B
CBϕOut <
B
DoubleϕOut <
B
BAϕOut.
4) If C is rational and send informal contracts, he/she will only choose Left if 25 > 40−l.
In both C-B and Double treatment, the decision problem for C is the same. Therefore,
we expect no differences between the two treatments. And the rate of C choosing Right
in both C-B and Double treatment will be smaller than B-A treatment where there is
no incentive for C to choose Left at all.
Combine both Proposition 1 and 2, we have:
Proposition 3 (EJ model) If l < 15, piϕs =
p
jϕs, where i, j ∈ t and i 6= j; If
l ≥ 15, for player B, BBaseϕOut = BBAϕOut = BDoubleϕOut < BCBϕOut; for player C,
C
BaseϕR =
C
BAϕR =
C
DoubleϕR >
C
CBϕR.
In the EJ model, everyone suffers the same cost from lying; therefore, if the benefit
of lying outweighs the cost, any communication is futile since words said will never
be kept. However, if the cost of lying outweighs the benefit, we expect people to keep
their contracts (if they send one). Thus, in both the B-A and Double treatments where
player B may send a contract , we hypothesize a higher rate of In than in the C-B
(C-A) treatments. Similarly, we expect to see a higher rate of cooperative action from
player C choosing Left in both the C-B (C-A) and Double treatments than in any other
treatments.
Heterogeneous cost to lying model
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Gibson et al. (2013) propose and test a heterogeneous preference for honesty model
(we call GTF model). The GTF model is very similar to the EJ model in that the cost
of lying is independent from any type of belief. The difference is that instead of a fixed
l for all players, the GTF model assumes that each individual might have a different
cost li associated with lying. The utility function is as follows:
ui =
{
mi − li if player i lies
mi otherwise.
(2)
where li indicates the utility loss player i endures when he(or she breaks the promise
or lies and li ∈ [0,+∞].
Game G5, G6, G7 in Figure 5, 6, 7 incorporate those. And we have Proposition 4
below.
Proposition 4 (GTF model) For player B, BBaseϕOut =
B
BAϕOut >
B
DoubleϕOut >
B
CBϕOut =
B
CAϕOut; for player C,
C
BaseϕR =
C
BAϕR >
C
DoubleϕR =
C
CBϕR =
C
CAϕR.
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Figure 5: G5 - B-A treatment
Proof. 1) Similarly, in the B-A treatment, all Bs choose Out given that Right is the
dominant strategy for Cs.
2) In the Double treatment, for the 1 − c percent of Bs who do not receive informal
contracts, Out is the best response. For the b·c percent of Bs who both send and receive
informal contracts from C, they will only choose In if p(20− li)−(1−p)li ≥ 10. p = 1 if
11
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Figure 6: G6 - C-B(C-A) treatment
lj ≤ 15, and p = 0 otherwise. Assume that Pr(lj ≥ 15) = w and Pr(li ≤ 10) = k, only
w · k · b · c percent of B (whose cost to default on informal contracts is small enough,
while his/her partners cost is big enough) choose In and (1−w ·k)b·c choose In. For the
remaining (1− b)c percent of Bs who do not send but receive informal contracts from
C, they will only choose In, if 20p ≥ 10. We have w · (1− b)c percent of Bs choosing
In, and (1− v)(1− b)c percent of Bs choosing Out. In total, w · k · b · c + w · (1− b)c
percent of Bs choose In and the rest choose Out.
3) In the C-B treatment, similar to the Double treatment, the 1− c percent of Bs who
do not receive informal contracts choose Out. The rest will choose In only if 20p ≥ 10.
Since p = 1 with probability w, we have w · c percent of Bs choosing In and 1− w · c
percent of Bs choosing Out. Since BDoubleϕIn = w · k · b · c+ w · (1− b)c is smaller than
B
CBϕIn = w · c, we should expect a higher frequency of Bs choosing In from C-B to the
Double treatment.
For player B’s behavior, the GTF model hypothesizes that B may choose In more
frequently in the C-B treatment than in the Double treatment and also more frequently
in Double treatment than B-A and Baseline treatments. The reasons are as follows.
In the B-A and baseline treatments, it is always the best response for B to choose
Out, anticipating C to prefer Right. In the Double treatment, however, choosing In
can become the best response for some message-receiving Bs when there is increased
probability of C choosing Left (for those Cs with lj > 15). In the C-B treatment,
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Figure 7: G7 - Double treatment
choosing In can be the best response for ALL message-sending Bs when their matched
Cs are with lj > 15.
2.3.2 Consequence-based Model
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) proposed a guilt from blame model built on the
psychological game theory framework developed by Geanakoplos et al. (1989), furthered
by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and formalized in Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2007). In this model, the cost of lying comes from the guilt of letting someone down,
and the level of guilt a player suffers depends on the level of harm he imposes on
others relative to what the others believe they will suffer (i.e., the difference between
the players actual action and the action the player believes others believe he would
take). In a sense, this model is a different take on social preference models, where the
degree one cares about others also depends on the belief one holds about others belief
about him/her.
According to the Guilt Aversion Model (we call CD model from now onwards),
player i has the following modified utility:
ui = mi − γi · τi ·∆mj, i 6= j (3)
where γi denotes player i’s sensitivity to guilt, and it is independent from τi; γi ∈
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[0,+∞); τi denotes player is belief about js belief about i, τi = E(µj), where µj is
the probability player j assigns to is move, µj ∈ [0, 1]; ∆mj denotes j’s monetary loss
between what i thinks j thinks that i would do and what i actually does. In light
of our game with B-A treatment where B sends a contract to A, ∆mA in this case
would be $10, which is what A would get given B’s informal contracts (this is also the
monetary payoff B would expect A to believe B would be able to give him/her) minus
0 (if, instead of choosing Out, B deviates from his/her contract and chooses In. since
the best strategy for C is to choose Right, A would get 0 given B and Cs (In, Right)
choices) equals 10.
G8, G9, G10 in Figure 8, 9, and 10, respectively, incorporate the CD model for all
treatments. Notice that in the B-A treatment, player B doesn’t suffer from guilt, when
he/she chooses In (violating informal contracts) and player C chooses Left. The reason
is that when player C plays Left, A receives $10, which is the same if B has chosen Out.
In other words, violating the contract has no monetary consequences to A if C chooses
Left, thus B doesnt feel any letting down guilt. Similarly, in the Double treatment,
B doesnt suffer utility loss from guilt choosing In and breaking informal contracts as
long as C chooses Left.
C
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40
Figure 8: G8 - B-A treatment
Proposition 5 (CD model) For player B, BBaseϕOut =
B
BAϕOut >
B
CBϕOut =
B
CAϕOut =
B
DoubleϕOut; for player C,
C
BaseϕR =
C
BAϕR =
C
DoubleϕR >
C
CBϕR =
C
CAϕR.
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Figure 9: G9 - C-B(C-A) treatment
Proof. 1) Similar to the analysis for the EJ model, b percent of Bs in B-A treatment
will only choose In, if 20p − γi · τi · 10 · (1− p) ≥ 10. Anticipating that Right is Cs
dominant strategy, p = 0, Out is the best response for all Bs.
2) In the Double treatment, for the 1 − c percent of Bs who do not receive informal
contracts, Out is the best response. For the b·c percent of Bs who both send and receive
informal contracts from C, they will only choose In if 20p−γi ·τi ·10(1− p) ≥ 10. p = 1
if 25 ≥ 40−γj · τj · 20, and p = 0 otherwise. Assume that Pr(25 ≥ 40−γj · τj · 20) = v,
we have v · b · c percent of B choose In and (1− v)b · c choose Out. For the remaining
(1 − b)c percent of Bs who do not send but receive informal contracts from C, they
will only choose In, if 20p ≥ 10. We have v · (1 − b)c percent of Bs choosing In, and
(1− v)(1− b)c percent of Bs choosing Out. In total, v · c percent of Bs choose In and
1− v · c percent of Bs choose Out, i.e., BDoubleϕOut = 1− v · c.
3) In the C-B treatment, similar to the Double treatment, the 1− c percent of Bs who
do not receive informal contracts choose Out. The rest will choose In only if 20p ≥ 10.
Since p = 1 with probability v, we have v · c percent of Bs choosing In and 1 − v · c
percent of Bs choosing Out, which is the same as in Double treatment.
The CD model offers the same predictions on player Cs behavior as EJ and GTF
models; likewise, the intuition (i.e., lying is costly, although in the CD model defaulting
on informal contracts is costly due to the fact that lying always lowers a partners
payoff) is similar among all three models. For player B, the CD model differs from the
15
Later C 
Promises B 
LEFT
B Promises 
A OUT 
First
C
RIGHT
OUT IN
B
LEFT
A
OUT IN
A :5
B :5
C :10
10
10
10
10
20
25
0
−γ i ⋅τ i ⋅10
40 − γ j ⋅τ j ⋅20
Figure 10: G10 - Double treatment
EJ model in that each player may have varying costs from lying, and it is different from
GTF model in that the different costs are from “letting-down” resulted guilt. Also, the
level of guilt depends on guilt sensitivity and potential harm that may incur to others
while in GTF model, the cost of lying is innate and independent from consequences.
The key prediction difference between the CD and EJ models (when l > 15) is player
B’s behavior in the Double treatment: in the EJ model, breaking informal contracts is
costly, and consequently player B in the Double treatment behaves the same way in the
B-A treatment; in the CD model, however, breaking informal contracts can be costless
for player B as long as there is no foreseeable harm to player A ( which is clearly the
case if C chooses Left); as a result, we should observe an increased rate of B choosing
In for the Double treatment versus the B-A treatment.
2.3.3 Simple Type Model
Hurkens and Kartik (2009) put forward a simple type model that can make sense of
the observations in Gneezy (2005) (we call it the HK model). The HK model assumes
that there are two types of people, one with infinite cost of lying (honest type), and
the other with zero cost of lying (economic type).
ui = mi − i · L (4)
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where i indicates players’ type, i ∈ {0, 1}, if i = 0, player i is economic type with
no cost to lying, while if i = 1, i is honest type with infinite cost to lying; L denotes
an enormous cost to breaking informal contracts and L → +∞. Assume that in the
population ρ percent are honest types, and 1 − ρ percent are economic types. The
implications of the HK model for our game are detailed in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 (HK model) For player B, BBaseϕOut =
B
BAϕOut >
B
DoubleϕOut =
B
CBϕOut =
B
CAϕOut; for player C,
C
BaseϕR =
C
BAϕR >
C
DoubleϕR =
C
CBϕR =
C
CAϕR.
Proof. 1) As with all other theories, the HK model predicts that all Bs choose Out
given that Right is the dominant strategy for Cs in the B-A treatment.
2) In the Double treatment, for the 1 − c percent of Bs who do not receive informal
contracts, Out is the best response. For the b·c percent of Bs who both send and receive
informal contracts from C, ρ · b · c of them are the honest type, and will always choose
Out as they state in the informal contracts. Among the remaining (1−ρ)b · c economic
types, they will only choose In if 20p ≥ 10. p = 1 if they receive informal contracts from
an honest type, which happens with probability of ρ, and p = 0 otherwise. Therefore,
we have ρ(1− ρ)b · c percent of Bs choosing In and (1− ρ)2b · c choosing Out. For the
remaining (1− b)c percent of Bs who do not send but receive informal contracts from
C, they will only choose In, if 20p ≥ 10. We have ρ · (1− b)c percent of Bs choosing
In, and (1− ρ)(1− b)c percent of Bs choosing Out. In total, ρ · c(1− b · ρ) percent of
Bs choose In and the rest choose Out.
3) In the C-B treatment, similar to the Double treatment, 1− c percent of Bs who do
not receive informal contracts choose Out. The rest will choose In only if 20p ≥ 10.
Since p = 1 with probability ρ, we have ρ · c percent of Bs choosing In and 1 − ρc
percent of Bs choosing Out, which is the greater than Double treatment.
The predictions under the HK model are indistinguishable from the GTF model
in our game settings, and the reasoning behind the hypotheses is quite similar. In
the GTF model, an honest type never lies, whereas an economic type has no cost of
lying if the outcome from lying is preferred. Communication thus only has an effect
on the behaviors of an honest type who chooses to send a message. As for player C,
the changes in aggregate behavior only come from honest types who communicate. For
player B, anticipating that some Cs would switch and choose Left, all Bs from the C-B
treatment, all economic-type Bs, and some honest-type Bs who choose not to send a
message from the Double treatment have the incentive to switch to In. And in both
B-A and baseline treatment, there is no incentive for any type of Bs to deviate from
choosing Out.
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3 Key Hypotheses
Following the analysis in section 2, Table 1 and 2 below summarizes hypothesis un-
der different existing theories. The tables can be read as follows: the inequality (equal)
sign represents the comparison outcome between the row treatment and the column
treatment. For example, the equal sign on row 3 column 2 implies that the frequency
of Bs choosing Out is expected to be the same between Baseline and B-A treatments.
Notice that all theories except for EJ model with l < 15 predict the same treatment
effects compared with Baseline for both players B and C. However, the predictions dif-
fer when we compare between treatments. Hypothesis 1–4 investigates the treatment
effects compared with Baseline, and hypothesis 5–6 focuses on the between-treatment
differences under which existing theories offer different predictions.
Table 1: Frequency of Bs Choosing Out : Bt ϕOut
EJ model (l < 15) EJ model
(l ≥ 15)/GTF
model/HK model
CD model
B-A C-B C-A Double B-A C-B C-A Double B-A C-B C-A Double
Baseline = = = = = > > > = > > >
B-A = = = > > > > > >
C-B = = = > = =
C-A = > =
Note: the inequality (equal) sign represents the comparison outcome between the row treatment and the column
treatment.
Table 2: Frequency of Cs Choosing Right : Ct ϕR
EJ model (l < 15) EJ model (l ≥ 15)/GTF
model/HK model/CD model
B-A C-B C-A Double B-A C-B C-A Double
Baseline = = = = = > > >
B-A = = = > > >
C-B = = = =
C-A = >
Note: the inequality (equal) sign represents the comparison outcome between the row treat-
ment and the column treatment.
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Hypothesis 1 (B-A vs. Baseline) the proportion of Bs choosing Out is the same
in both the baseline and B-A treatments, BBaseϕOut =
B
BAϕOut; the proportion of Cs
choosing Right is the same in both the baseline and B-A treatments, CBaseϕR =
C
BAϕR.
All the models offer the same prediction with regard to the B-A and baseline treat-
ments. If this hypothesis is rejected, we can invalidate all models under consideration.
Otherwise, all models are possibly valid.
Hypothesis 2 (C-B vs. Baseline) there is a lower percentage of Bs choosing Out in
the C-B treatment than in the Baseline treatment, BCBϕOut <
B
BaseϕOut; and a lower
percentage of Cs choosing Right in the C-B treatment than in the Baseline treatment,
C
CBϕR <
C
BaseϕR.
If this hypothesis is rejected, we can invalidate the EJ model with l ≥ 15, CD and
the GTF/HK model. Otherwise, we can invalidate the EJ model with l < 15.
Hypothesis 3 (Double vs. Baseline) there is a lower percentage of Bs choosing Out
in the Double treatment than in Baseline treatment, BDoubleϕOut <
B
BaseϕOut; and a
lower percentage of Cs choosing Right in the Double treatment than in the Baseline
treatment, CDoubleϕR <
C
BaseϕR.
If this hypothesis is rejected, we can invalidate CD and GTF/HK model. Otherwise,
we can invalidate both EJ models.
Hypothesis 4 (C-A vs. Baseline) there is a lower percentage of Bs choosing Out in
the C-A treatment than in the Baseline treatment, BCAϕOut <
B
BaseϕOut; and a lower
percentage of Cs choosing Right in the C-A treatment than in the Baseline treatment,
C
CAϕR <
C
BaseϕR .
Similar to Hypothesis 2, if this hypothesis is rejected, we can invalidate the EJ
model with l ≥ 15, the CD model, and the GTF/HK model. Otherwise, we can
invalidate the EJ model with l < 15.
Hypothesis 5 (C-A vs. C-B) the percentage of Bs choosing Out is the same in both
the C-A and C-B treatments, BCAϕOut <
B
CBϕOut; and the percentage of Cs choosing
Right is the same in both the C-A and C-B treatments, CCAϕR <
C
CBϕR.
All the existing theories treat informal contracts/commitments the same regardless
of the decision relevance of the receiver of the promise. A promise from C to A should
be treated the same as a promise to B. If this hypothesis is rejected, we can invalidate
all models.
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Hypothesis 6 (C-B vs. Double) the proportion of Bs choosing Out is the same
in both the C-B and Double treatments, BCBϕOut <
B
DoubleϕOut; the proportion of Cs
choosing Right is the same in both the C-B and Double treatments, CCBϕR <
C
DoubleϕR.
If the hypothesis for player B is rejected, we can invalidate the CD model. Other-
wise, we can invalidate all other models. And if the hypothesis for player C is rejected,
we can invalidate all models.
4 Experimental Procedure
The experimental sessions were conducted in the experimental laboratory of the
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science at George Mason University. Partici-
pants were seated at spaced intervals. We conducted 17 sessions with 9-12 participants
per session (total of 273 subjects). Participants could only participate in one session.
Average earnings were $17; sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes.
We used within design in our experiment. In each session, subjects played three
games (treatments) in random order. Subjects were fully aware that for each game they
were matched with complete strangers with whom they had never previously interacted
before. Only one of the games was randomly selected at the end of the experiment
to be a paid game. The session and corresponding game played are shown in Table
38. During each session, participants were referred to as A or B or C (as in the games
in section 2). Participants roles in the experiment were randomly determined at the
beginning of the experiment when subjects privately drew from a stack of cards with
a letter (“A”, “B” or “C”) and a number written on them. The letter indicated the
participant’s role in the session. Participants’ roles stayed constant throughout the
experiment. Note that the Double treatment was never run together with either the
B-A or C-B treatments; the reason is that the Double treatment effectively combines
the B-A and C-B treatment. If had run the Double treatment together with the B-
A and(or or C-B treatments, participants would have had to write messages to the
same role twice, which could have potentially confounded treatment differences (such
as different contents in the messages).
We adopted the strategy method in conducting our experiment, as did Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006)9. In the Baseline treatment, no messages were allowed. In all other
8Notice that in Table 3 ,A-C treatment isnt discussed in this paper since it is less relevant for the
purpose of this paper.
9This is an effort to make the results more comparable for theory testing purposes. Also Amdur
and Schmick (2012) suggest that there is no behavioral difference between the use of strategy method
and direct response for our type of game with communication.
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Table 3: Session – Game information
Session No. Game Played
1-7 Baseline, B-A treatment, C-B treatment
7-13 Baseline, Double treatment, C-A treatment
14-17 Baseline, Double treatment, A-C treatment
treatments with communication, each potential message-sender had the option to send
a nonbinding messages to their matched partner prior to their partners’ decision; they
were given a sheet of paper, but could decline to send a message by circling the letter
(A, B or C) that indicated their role in the experiment at the top of the otherwise-blank
sheet. Then messages were transmitted to the respective partners. Upon completion
of the message transmission, participants played the game; B made his/ her choice of
In or Out without knowing A’s actual choice of In or Out (similarly, C made his/her
decision without know the actual decision of B), but the instruction explained that B’s
choice would be immaterial if A chose Out. We therefore obtained an observation for
every B and C.
5 Results
We present a summary of communication and detail players behavioral patterns in
Section 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. In Section 5.3, we test the hypothesis from Section 3.
5.1 Communication Summary - Messages and Their Contents
What messages were sent? Free-form messages can potentially be classified in
various ways. To simplify the analysis, we assume that a player can make a statement
regarding his/her planned action or stay silent. For instance, Player B can make a
statement regarding his(or her planned action (In or Out) and Player C can make
a statement (Left or Right). Staying silent indicates two things: no messages are
transmitted or the message shows no indication of the players planned action. Here, we
denote a statement of planned action as Informal Contract/Commitment, and staying
silent as Silence. From the messages that we collected, informal contracts from B
always involve a statement indicating the action Out, while all the informal contracts
from C involve a statement indicating the action Left.
Table 4 below summarizes the frequency of messages (communication) and infor-
mal contract in each of the treatments. The difference between the two indicates the
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percentage of messages that belongs to Silence. The data generally support our as-
sumption that both the rate of communication and the frequency of informal contract
are constant for the same role as long as there is no contingency that must occur before
the contract is realized.
As shown in Table 4, Player B sends messages about 88 percent of the time in both
the B-A and Double treatments (z = 0.11, p = 0.92). Player C sends messages about
80 percent of the time in both the C-B and Double treatments (z = 0.83, p = 0.40);
however, in the C-A treatment, player Cs are significantly less likely to send messages
(z = 2.60, p = 0.01); less than half of them sent messages to As.
Table 4: Communication Summary by Treatment
All Messages Informal Contracts
Treatment Player B Player C Player B Player C
B-A 21/24 13/24
(88%) (54%)
C-B 20/24 16/24
(83%) (67%)
C-A 13/27 7/27
(48%) (26%)
Double 38/43 32/43 22/43 29/43
(88%) (74%) (51%) (67%)
For informal contracts/commitments, player B sends informal con-
tracts/commitments) about 53 percent of time in both the B-A and Double treatments
(z = 0.23, p = 0.81). And player C sends informal contracts commitments around 67
percent of the time in both the C-B and Double treatments (z = 0.06, p = 0.95). In
the C-A treatment, consistent with the pattern for messages, Cs are significantly less
likely to send informal contracts/commitments to As compared with C-B and Double
(z = 2.89, p = 0.00; z = 3.36, p = 0.00, respectively); around a quarter of them sent
informal contracts/commitments to As. However, we can reject the null hypotheses
(p = 0.00) that there are no informal contracts/commitments exchanged in the C-A
treatment as compared to Baseline.
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5.2 Data Summary
5.2.1 Behavioral Patterns Across Treatments
Figure 11 summarizes the choices of players A, B and C for the various treatments.
In Baseline, where there is no communication opportunity, 81% of As chose Out, 76%
of Bs chose Out, and 73% of Cs chose the defective option Right. The behaviors
we observed are well described by the unique backward induction Nash equilibrium
strategy profile (In, Out, Right).
0
1
20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
Baseline B-A C-B Double C-A
Role by Treatment
A Choose In B Choose Out
C Choose Right
Figure 11: Choices By Role Across All Treatments
In the B-A treatment, we observe a similar percentage of As choosing In (83%),
even more Bs - 87% - choosing Out, and a similar percentage of Cs choosing Right
(71%). Compared with Baseline, more Bs chose Out, although the percentage is not
statistically significant. The informal contracts from Bs reduce Bs willingness to explore
potential Pareto improving opportunities.
In the C-B treatment, 71% of As chose In, half of Bs switched and chose Out
(42%), and more than half of Cs (58%) chose the cooperative action - Right. When B
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receives informal contracts from C, not only does B choose to trust C, C also recip-
rocates. The informal contracts from Cs are effective in binding Cs behaviors despite
the misalignment of monetary interest between B and C.
In the Double treatment, 95% of As chose In, only 56% of Bs chose Out, and
56% of Cs chose Right. B sends informal contracts to A indicating the willingness to
choose Out ; however, when new opportunities arise (C sends commitment conveying
the willingness to cooperate), significantly less Bs (p = 0.00) chose Out (an action
that is consistent with their informal contracts). In this environment, informal con-
tracts/commitments are less effective in binding peoples behaviors.
When C could send a message to A (C-A treatment), 74% of As chose In, 63% of
Bs chose Out, and 67% of Cs choose Right. The behaviors in this treatment resemble
those in Baseline, which suggests that communication in the form of informal contracts
is ineffective in promoting trust and reciprocity.
5.2.2 Comparison of Nash Play and Pareto Improving Play Across Treat-
ments
We use the bootstrap method to compare the frequency of Nash equilibrium strat-
egy profile (In, Out, Right) and Pareto efficient strategy profile (In, In, Left) among
different treatments. The distributions of frequencies for Nash strategy profile (In,
Out, Right) and Pareto Efficient profile (In, In, Left) across treatments are shown in
figure 12 and 13, respectively.
We find that the B-A treatment has the highest frequency of Nash strategy profile
(p = .26 compared with Baseline, p = .00 with C-B, p = .06 with Double, p = .00
with C-A ), and on average, this strategy profile is played about half of the time. B-A
is followed by Baseline (p = .12 compared with Double treatment, p = .00 with C-B,
p = .03 with C-A) and the Double treatment (p = .21 compared with C-A treatment,
p = .00 with C-B), while the C-B treatment has the lowest frequency of Nash play
where the Nash profile is played around 4% of the time on average.
As for the frequency of Pareto efficient strategy profile, we observe that the C-
B treatment has the highest frequency for (In, In, Left) strategy profile (p = .00
compared with Baseline, p = .00 with B-A, p = .08, with Double, p = .02 with C-A),
and the Pareto efficient strategy is played 29% of the time on average. (In, In, Left) is
played in the Double treatment about 14% of the time (p = .19, compared with C-A
treatment, p = .01 compared with Baseline, p = .00 with B-A). The B-A treatment has
the lowest frequency of Pareto efficient strategy profile, and it is almost never played.
24
0
2
4
6
8
10
De
ns
ity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
r(mean)
Baseline BA Treatment
CB Treatment Double Treatment
CA Treatment
Figure 12: Bootstrap distribution of frequency of Nash strategy profile (In, Out, Right)
by treatments (Resample N = 999)
5.3 Hypothesis Testing
In summary, our experimental data support Hypotheses 1 –3 and Hypothesis 6,
while failing to support Hypotheses 4 and 5.
Result 1 Treatment effects compared with Baseline.
Tables 5 and 6 below present the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sided test results with
the null hypotheses that BBaseϕOut =
B
t′ϕOut, where t
′ ∈ {BA,CB,Double}. As pre-
dicted by all theories, behaviors in the B-A treatment are statistically indistinguishable
from Baseline. We observe significantly fewer Bs and Cs choosing Out(or Right in both
the C-B and Double treatments than in Baseline; thus, we can invalidate the EJ theory
with l < 15. However, we cannot find support for Hypothesis 4; instead we did not
observe any treatment differences between the C-A treatment and Baseline. On the
contrary, all existing theories predict negative treatment effects for both B and C, and
we can therefore invalidate all theories under consideration.
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Figure 13: Bootstrap distribution of frequency of Pareto improving strategy profile
(In, In, Left) by treatments (resample N = 999)
Result 2 Within treatment comparison.
Table 7 presents the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sided test results with the null
hypotheses that BCBϕR =
B
t”ϕR, where t” ∈ {CA,Double}. There is significant dif-
ference in Cs behavior between the C-A and C-B treatments, which is contrary to
what all theories predicted. However, this difference may result from the fact that
there are significantly fewer informal contracts/commitments exchanged in the C-A
treatment than in the C-B treatment. Additionally, we conducted another test to de-
termine whether there are behavioral differences between the two treatments among
those who sent informal contracts/commitments. We fail to reject the null hypothesis
(p = 0.40) that there are behavioral differences, although this failure to reject may
also arise from the small number of observations (n = 16 for C-B treatment and n = 7
for C-A treatment). Comparing C-B with the Double treatment, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that CCBϕR =
C
DoubleϕR and the evidence is more in support of the CD
model.
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Table 5: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sided test results for Player B
Frequency of Bs Choosing Out : Bt ϕOut
Baseline B-A C-B C-A Double
51/67 21/24 10/24 17/27 24/43
(76%) (87%) (42%)∗∗∗ (63%) (56%)∗∗
p = 0.24 p = 0.00 p = 0.20 p = 0.03
Note: *,**, and *** indicate p < 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, re-
spectively, two-sided tests.
Table 6: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sided test results for Player C
Frequency of Cs Choosing Right : Ct ϕR
Baseline B-A C-B C-A Double
49/67 17/24 10/24 18/27 24/43
(73%) (71%) (42%)∗∗∗ (67%) (56%)∗
p = 0.83 p = 0.01 p = 0.53 p = 0.06
Note: *,**, and *** indicate p < 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, re-
spectively, two-sided tests.
To summarize, we find only limited support for the existing theories. For a detailed
comparison between the theory predictions and observed behaviors, please refer to
Tables 8 and 9 below.
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Table 7: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Two-sided Test Results For Player B and C (Within
Treatment)
Frequency of Bs
Choosing Out : Bt ϕR
Frequency of Cs
Choosing Right : Ct ϕR
C-B C-A Double C-B C-A Double
10/24 17/27 24/43 10/24 18/27 24/43
(42%) (63%) (56%) (42%) (67%)∗ (56%)
p = 0.13 p = 0.27 p = 0.08 p = 0.27
Note: *,**, and *** indicate p < 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively, two-sided tests.
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6 Discussion
We find, as have many others, that communicationthe formation of informal con-
tractsimpacts behavior in the game we study. One of the important new observations
from this paper is that the extent to which a person feels behaviorally bound by the
contract they form depends on whether that contract is formed with a person with
whom they directly interact. We call this a “contingency effect”. Specifically, the like-
lihood with which people will follow an informal contract (or plan) declines according
to the number of contingencies that must occur in order for the contract to be realized.
To our knowledge, this pattern is unaccounted-for by existing theories, and has not
been observed empirically due to the fact that previous studies have focused on the
effect of direct communication between two individuals (or groups). Below, we offer
several potential explanations for the contingency effect.
Charness (2000) proposed a responsibility alleviation effect to explain the increased
generosity from the subjects in a gift-exchange game when wages are determined by a
random process rather than assigned by a third party. The responsibility alleviation
effect states that people’s innate pro-sociality is moderated when they can shift the
responsibility of the final outcome. Similarly, Ellman and Pezanis-Christou (2010)
demonstrate that vertical decision-making structure sharply diffuses each individuals
sense of personal responsibility, thereby reducing pro-social behaviors. In our game,
C’s decision is only partially responsible for the outcome of A, as B has the option to
choose Out and shares the responsibility of the final outcome of the game. Consistent
with our data, this predicts that C may behave in a more self-interested way and
become less likely to choose the option indicated on the informal contract.
Another possibility is that players follow descriptive norms that emerge during the
game (see, Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009). In our case, Player C’s decision is realized only
when B chooses In; however, in doing so, B indicates that it is appropriate to choose
a selfish option. Taking this as the relevant norm, C may be more likely to conform
and choose according to his/her own self-interest, even though the informal contract
mandates otherwise.
7 Conclusion
Previous research indicates that unenforceable informal contracts/commitments
promote trust and reciprocity. While such contracts can benefit existing exchange,
they may, in dynamic environments, decrease ones willingness to explore Pareto effi-
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cient opportunities. This issue arises in both business and social contexts, including
industry non-compete agreements and personal relationship commitment decisions. We
study an environment that differs from previous environments in three important ways:
(1) we consider communication among three parties, thereby enriching the communi-
cation environment; (2) we study cases where informal contracts/commitments bind
people to Pareto-inferior outcomes; and (3) we allow multiple contingencies necessary
for these plans to be realized.
Our results indicate that when, between the point of commitment and the point of
decision, no new information is received regarding the expected value of commitment,
then people overwhelmingly decide in accord with their informal contracts and avoid
exploring potentially Pareto improving opportunities. However, when new information
arises that reduces the relative value of commitment, and when this occurs following
the commitment but before the decision, then people are significantly more likely to
deviate from their informal contract and pursue a Pareto improvement. And lastly,
we find that the extent to which a person feels behaviorally bound by the contract
they form depends on whether that contract is formed with a person with whom they
directly interact – the contingency effect. When contingency of such informal contracts
increases (even by one level), the binding power of such contracts drastically decreases.
We also present predictions from three types of existing relevant behavioral models
based on intrinsic preference, consequence, and types, respectively. When communica-
tion is allowed, all theories offer some degree of trust and cooperation, although through
different mechanisms. Regarding treatment differences, simple type models share pre-
dictions with intrinsic preference-based models, though the mechanism differs. While
intrinsic preference-based models make predictions that allow little behavioral devia-
tion from informal contract across different treatments, models based on consequences,
e.g., the CD model, allow some degree of deviation.
As for the behavioral pattern we observed across treatments, each of the three types
of theories could capture these patterns to some degree. For example, all theories
predict treatment differences from baseline that are consistent with our observations;
the difference we observe between the Double and C-B treatments is more consistent
with consequence–based models. However, the contingency effect we uncovered was not
considered by any of the existing theories, suggesting that future behavioral models
that permit communication to foster trust and cooperation may also need to take
contingency into account to better capture the observed behaviors.
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